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Abstract
Internet payment blockades are an attempt to enforce intellectual
property rights by “following the money” that flows to online merchants
who profit from piracy and counterfeiting. Where corporate copyright
and trademark owners failed in the legislature and the judiciary to create
binding public law requiring payment processors like MasterCard and
Visa to act as intellectual property enforcers, “non-regulatory”
intervention from the executive branch secured their cooperation as a
matter of private ordering. The resulting voluntary best practices
agreement prescribes a notice-and-termination protocol that extends the
reach of U.S. intellectual property law into cyberspace, to merchants
operating “foreign infringing sites.” It also privatizes the adjudication of
infringement claims, raising issues of fairness and institutional
competence. Like other forms of regulation by online intermediaries,
payment blockades are subject to circumvention through
disintermediation. Marrying peer-to-peer (P2P) technology with financial
transactions, P2P virtual currencies like Bitcoin allow online merchants
and their customers to work around payment blockades.
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INTRODUCTION
In August of 2010, Pentagon officials publicly threatened reprisals
against Julian Assange and his website, WikiLeaks, over the site’s
publication of leaked military and diplomatic documents, many of them
containing information embarrassing to the U.S. government.1 Less than
a week later, the U.K.-based payment processor Moneybookers (now
rebranded as Skrill) stopped accepting public donations to WikiLeaks and
closed its account.2 In December of that year, PayPal did the same,

1. Taylor Barnes, Pentagon Threatens to ‘Compel’ WikiLeaks to Hand over Afghan War
Data, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorismsecurity/2010/0806/Pentagon-threatens-to-compel-WikiLeaks-to-hand-over-Afghan-war-data.
2. David Leigh & Rob Evans, WikiLeaks Says Funding Has Been Blocked After
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
14,
2010,
12:55
AM),
Government
Blacklisting,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/ oct/14/ wikileaks-says-funding-is-blocked; About Us:
Our Company, SKRILL, https://www.skrill. com/en/about-us/ our-company/ (last visited July 5,
2015) (noting the rebrand of Moneybookers to Skrill in 2013).
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followed shortly thereafter by Visa and MasterCard.3 Cumulatively, these
actions created a payment blockade that seriously threatened the site’s
continued existence. According to Assange, the blockade cost WikiLeaks
95% of its revenue and very nearly starved it to death.4 None of the
participating payment processors was under court order to block
payments to WikiLeaks, and there had been no legal process in either the
United Kingdom or the United States finding Assange or WikiLeaks
guilty of any crime.5 The blockade resulted from a series of business
decisions by corporate executives and their risk managers. When queried
by a journalist from Forbes about the reason for their actions, MasterCard
and Visa offered no comment.6 Moneybookers cited the fact that the U.S.
government had added WikiLeaks to its “terrorism watchlist.”7
Documents later obtained and released by WikiLeaks in connection with
a European Commission investigation of the blockade established that
staffers for U.S. lawmakers directly pressured MasterCard and Visa to
take the action they took.8
The crippling multilateral payment blockade to which WikiLeaks
became subject highlights the existential power of payment
intermediaries in the Internet ecosystem and the indirect control they can
exercise over online transactions and associated speech. Whereas it is
trivially easy for the operator of a seized or blacklisted domain name to
relocate objectionable content to another domain, it is much more
difficult for a website operator to replace a canceled banking
relationship.9 Indeed, payment intermediaries are uniquely positioned to
3. Andy Greenberg, Visa, MasterCard Move to Choke WikiLeaks, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2010,
10:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/12/07/visa-mastercard-move-tochoke-wikileaks/.
4. Esther Addley & Jason Deans, WikiLeaks Suspends Publishing to Fight Financial
Blockade, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2011, 8:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/
oct/24/wikileaks-suspends-publishing.
5. Glenn Greenwald, Prosecution of Anonymous Activists Highlights War for Internet
Control, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2012, 8:53 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2012/nov/23/anonymous-trial-wikileaks-internet-freedom.
6. Greenberg, supra note 3.
7. Leigh & Evans, supra note 2.
8. See Press Ass’n, Julian Assange Expresses Surprise over EU WikiLeaks Decision, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:02 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/nov/27/julianassange-eu-wikileaks-decision; Greenwald, supra note 5 (reporting that Senate Homeland
Security Committee Chairman Joe Lieberman was one of the sources of the pressure against
WikiLeaks).
9. Damon McCoy et al., Priceless: The Role of Payments in Abuse-advertised Goods, 2012
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 845, 847, available
at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2382285 (“[A] miscreant can replace a suspended domain
name within minutes at a cost of a few dollars, but if a banking relationship is shuttered they may
lose hundreds of thousands of dollars in holdback and spend weeks developing a suitable
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police online activity because approximately eighty percent of online
transactions use a credit or debit card as a method of payment, and most
of those transactions go through one of two payment systems:
MasterCard or Visa.10 As Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley have observed,
concentration and high barriers to entry in the market for payment
processing make payment intermediaries a logical choke point for
regulators to target.11 Moreover, payment blockades can reach online
enterprises hosted abroad, thereby extending the reach of U.S. power and
law beyond their territorial limits.12
Julian Assange managed to elude U.S. authorities by hiding out in the
Ecuadorian embassy in London.13 WikiLeaks was not so lucky, insofar
as it was operationally reliant on private actors amenable to official
pressure and well-situated to punish officially disapproved conduct.14
The WikiLeaks payment blockade was an expression through private
actors of the government’s desire to regulate the flow of information over
the Internet for law enforcement purposes. It serves as a fairly dramatic
example of the ease with which the government can convince powerful
corporate actors to do its bidding when behind-the-scenes pressure is
brought to bear.15 Public–private regulatory cooperation of this sort goes
by many names in the First Amendment literature, including proxy

replacement.”); see also Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs
and the War on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 716–17 (2014) [hereinafter Bridy, Carpe Omnia]
(explaining why domain name seizures have only transitory deterrent effects for online copyright
enforcement).
10. Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 239, 280 (2005).
11. Id. at 257–58; see also McCoy et al., supra note 9, at 847, § 2.3 (“Concentration, in
addition to the small number of acquirers accepting high-risk merchants, the long setup time for
new banking relationships, and the liability on revenue holdback, makes the payment tier an
attractive target for those seeking to combat [online counterfeiting].”).
12. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 10, at 279–80.
13. Scott Shane, Offering Snowden Aid, WikiLeaks Gets Back in the Game, N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/world/offering-snowden-aid-wikileaksgets-back-in-the-game.html.
14. See Press Ass’n, supra note 8.
15. The U.S. government successfully pressured other intermediaries to punish WikiLeaks
as well. Amazon.com terminated hosting services for WikiLeaks’ documents without any legal
process or court order. Doug Gross, WikiLeaks Cut off from Amazon Servers, CNN (Dec. 2, 2010,
8:49 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/12/01/wikileaks.amazon/index.html (reporting on the
service termination and quoting Senator Lieberman’s statement that Amazon had made the “right
decision”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/1

4

Bridy: Internet Payment Blockades

2015]

INTERNET PAYMENT BLOCKADES

1527

censorship,16 soft censorship,17 and “new-school” speech regulation.18
The U.S. government’s approach to enlisting payment intermediaries
as online law enforcers has historically been bimodal—a combination of
straightforward command-and-control regulation, as seen in the online
gambling context,19 and less transparent behind-the-scenes pressure, as
seen in the WikiLeaks case. The latter mode has been de rigueur in the
areas of anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy since the White House Office
of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) came into
existence in 2009.20
With the possibility of command-and-control regulation in the
background—and sometimes with such regulation pending in
Congress—IPEC has pressured a wide range of online intermediaries into
adopting “voluntary best practices” for assisting in the enforcement of
intellectual property rights.21 The most visible voluntary agreement in
16. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries,
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 14 (2006) (“The Internet’s resistance
to direct regulation of speakers and listeners rests on a complex chain of connections, and
emerging regulatory mechanisms have begun to focus on the weak links in that chain. Rather than
attacking speakers or listeners directly, governments have sought to enlist private actors within
the chain as proxy censors to control the flow of information.”).
17. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 870 (2012)
(contrasting “hard censorship” with “soft censorship” and including in the latter category
“persuasion through pressure”).
18. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296,
2298 (2014) (explaining that “new-school” techniques of speech regulation “regulate speech
through control over digital networks and auxiliary services like search engines, payment systems,
and advertisers; instead of focusing directly on publishers and speakers, they are aimed at the
owners of digital infrastructure”).
19. An example of command-and-control deputization of payment intermediaries as law
enforcers is the Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367
(2012), for which implementing regulations require financial institutions to identify and block
illegal online gambling transactions. See Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are
Doing About Online Liability and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1065 & n.121
(2010).
20. See, e.g., Oversight of Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Efforts: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4–5 (2011) (statement of Victoria A. Espinel,
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Management and Budget), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg92565/pdf/CHRG-112shrg92565.pdf
(“In
addition to increased law enforcement against private infringement, we need cooperation and
action from the private sector. . . . [W]e have been encouraging cooperative voluntary practices
to reduce infringement online that are practical and effective . . . . We strongly support these
voluntary agreements to help address counterfeiting and piracy online.”).
21. See, e.g., 2011 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL
REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 IPEC REP.],
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_
mar2012.pdf (reporting on the adoption of best practices agreements by payment systems and
Internet service providers); Victoria Espinel, Coming Together to Combat Online Piracy and
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this space is the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
corporate copyright owners and residential broadband providers that
created the Copyright Alert System (CAS), a graduated response protocol
for mitigating infringement over peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing
networks.22 A lesser-known agreement was concluded in the same year
by major payment processors and corporate copyright and trademark
owners. That agreement, which established a notice-and-termination
protocol for online merchants accused of piracy or counterfeiting, is the
subject of this Article. The payment processors’ best practices agreement
serves as one more example of a mode of regulation that Julia Black has
called “coerced self-regulation”23 and that I have described elsewhere as
state-promoted private ordering.24 As Mann and Belzley put it, Internet
intermediaries tend to coalesce around voluntary enforcement
agreements “not in the shadow of existing law, but in the shadow of
potential law.”25
This Article addresses the use and efficacy of Internet payment
blockades, or “follow the money” enforcement, for anti-counterfeiting
and anti-piracy purposes. It focuses on the voluntary best practices
Counterfeiting, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 15, 2013, 8:33 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2013/07/15/coming-together-combat-online-piracy-and-counterfeiting (reporting on the adoption
of a best practices agreement by online advertising networks).
22. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes”
Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2012)
[hereinafter Bridy, Graduated Response] (assessing the CAS with respect to freedom of
expression, privacy, fairness, proportionality, and transparency); Mary LaFrance, Graduated
Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black Box, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 165
(2012) (exploring problems relating to the MOU); Peter Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1373 (2010) (discussing graduated responses generally).
23. Julia Black, Constitutionalising Self-Regulation, 59 MODERN L. REV. 24, 27 (1996).
Black identifies four self-regulatory modes, each of which is defined in terms of the government’s
role in its development, adoption, and enforcement:
Broadly, we can identify four types of possible relationship: mandated selfregulation, in which a collective group, an industry or profession for example, is
required or designated by the government to formulate and enforce norms within
a framework defined by the government, usually in broad terms; sanctioned selfregulation, in which the collective group itself formulates the regulation, which
is then subjected to government approval; coerced self-regulation, in which the
industry itself formulates and imposes regulation but in response to threats by
the government that if it does not the government will impose statutory
regulation; and voluntary self-regulation, where there is no active state
involvement, direct or indirect, in promoting or mandating self-regulation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of Graduated Response, 26 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 559, 578 (2011).
25. Mann & Belzley, supra note 10, at 260 n.59.
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agreement adopted in 2011 by payment processors, including American
Express, Discover, MasterCard, PayPal, and Visa.26 Part I discusses the
regulatory environment that gave rise to the agreement. Part II describes
the agreement itself, including the merchant termination protocol it
specifies and the implementation of that protocol. Part III explores some
normative concerns associated with the use of payment blockades as an
anti-piracy and anti-counterfeiting strategy. Part IV considers the efficacy
of payment blockades, taking into account methods of circumvention
such as vouchers and virtual currencies.
I. WORKING TOWARD PAYMENT BLOCKADES: THE ROAD TO
VOLUNTARISM
This Part surveys the copyright and trademark industries’ multifaceted
strategy for deputizing payment intermediaries in the fight against online
counterfeiting and piracy. It traces industry efforts from the federal courts
to Congress and, finally, to the executive branch, where IPEC put the
weight of the White House behind a voluntary enforcement agreement
that all major processors of online payments ultimately adopted.
A. In the Courts: Perfect 10 and the Secondary Liability Gambit
The road to voluntary payment blockades for anti-piracy and anticounterfeiting enforcement begins with Perfect 10, a magazine publisher
and website operator selling subscription-based access to “tasteful
copyrighted images of the world’s most beautiful natural models.”27 In
2004, Perfect 10 sued Visa, MasterCard, and other payment
intermediaries (collectively, Visa) on the theory that they were
contributorily and vicariously liable for infringements occurring on socalled Stolen Content Websites to which Visa provided payment
processing services.28 Perfect 10’s secondary liability claims sounded in
both copyright and trademark law.29 The complaint alleged that Perfect
10 sent notices to Visa identifying the accused websites and stating that
customers of those websites were using Visa cards to purchase infringing
photographs.30 Visa admitted to receiving the notices but took no action
in response to them.31 The district court dismissed the claims against Visa
with prejudice on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.32 Perfect 10 appealed the
26. 2011 IPEC REP., supra note 21, at 1.
27. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 793, 805 n.18.
29. Id. at 793.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed the dismissal over a lengthy and vehement dissent from Judge
Alex Kozinski.33
A short primer on secondary liability doctrines in copyright and
trademark law is helpful for understanding the challenge courts face in
applying the doctrines to such functionally diverse online intermediaries
as broadband access providers, payment processors, search engines, ad
networks, auction platforms, and user-generated content sites. These
doctrines are the primary legal mechanism for incentivizing online
intermediaries to become regulators of their users’ speech and activity.34
No statutory cause of action exists for secondary infringement in either
the Copyright Act or the Lanham Act, but the doctrines of contributory
and vicarious infringement are well-established in both bodies of case
law.35 Trademark law, however, defines secondary infringement more
narrowly than copyright law does.36
From a policy perspective, well-defined and carefully circumscribed
secondary liability rules are necessary to prevent the injustice that could
easily result from making one party pay for another’s bad acts.37 The
common law standards for secondary infringement have evolved
accordingly: where the allegation is of contributory infringement, the
plaintiff must prove that the alleged secondary infringer acted culpably
to facilitate the infringement; where the allegation is of vicarious
infringement, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged secondary
infringer’s relationship to the direct infringer entailed a degree of control

33. Id. at 793; id. at 810 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
34. See John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of
Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1871–72 (2013).
35. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35 (1984)
(“The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by
another. . . . The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the
imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves
engaged in the infringing activity.”); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 165 (4th
Cir. 2012) (“Vicarious liability in the trademark context is essentially the same as in the tort
context.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine that derives from
the common law of torts.”).
36. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th
Cir. 1992) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19) (noting that there are “fundamental differences”
between copyright law and trademark law for purposes of determining secondary liability).
37. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (acknowledging that secondary infringement liability presents
the “problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable
for the actions of another”).
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that would justify holding the secondary infringer responsible for the
wrongs of the direct infringer.38
1. Contributory Copyright Infringement
An online intermediary can be liable for contributory copyright
infringement if it knows of its users’ infringing activity and “induces,
causes or materially contributes to [that] infringing conduct.”39 The
requisite knowledge on the part of the accused can be actual or
constructive, but in either case it must be knowledge of specific instances
of infringing activity, as opposed to a generalized knowledge that direct
infringement is occurring on the service in question.40 Willful blindness
to specific instances of infringement also constitutes knowledge, though
the courts have not established the precise contours of the willful
blindness doctrine in copyright cases.41 To prove willful blindness, a
plaintiff must show that the accused secondary infringer engaged in a
“deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge.”42
If a defendant “actively strives to provide the environment and the
market for counterfeit . . . sales,” then supplying the “site and facilities”
for infringing activity is sufficient to establish the element of causation
or material contribution.43 Inducing direct infringement likewise entails
active conduct intended to encourage direct infringement, such as
advertising an infringing use of a product or service or instructing users
how to use a product or service to infringe.44 Some courts treat
inducement as a distinct theory of secondary liability, but others treat it
as a species of contributory infringement.45 Courts have found
inducement and material contribution separately where online service
38. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that “in general, contributory liability is based on the defendant's failure to stop its
own actions which facilitate third-party infringement, while vicarious liability is based on the
defendant’s failure to cause a third party to stop its directly infringing activities”).
39. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
40. See id. at 1021 (holding that “absent any specific information which identifies infringing
activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely
because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material”).
41. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
42. In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
43. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1032 (9th Cir.
2013) (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
44. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
45. Compare, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“In Grokster, the Supreme Court confirmed that inducement of copyright
infringement constitutes a distinct cause of action.”), with Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d
754, 758 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing inducement as “a form of contributory infringement”).
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providers help users to locate infringing files for download on the
Internet.46 At a more general level, courts have found inducement where
a service provider “knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain to
result in direct infringement.”47 This more general proposition highlights
the role of causation in the contributory infringement analysis and the
debt that secondary liability doctrines in copyright law owe to tort law.48
Evaluating Perfect 10’s contributory infringement claim required the
Ninth Circuit to decide how its prior decisions interpreting the “site and
facilities” doctrine apply in an e-commerce context, where the
defendant’s services made direct infringement more profitable but were
not otherwise implicated in it.49 The majority adopted a carefully cabined
interpretation of what it means to provide the “site and facilities” for
infringement, reasoning that a broader interpretation would
improvidently expand the scope of secondary liability to reach
intermediaries whose systems are only peripherally related to infringing
activities.50 Although the majority acknowledged that Visa’s payment
systems “make it easier for . . . infringement to be profitable,” it held that
because the payment processors themselves were not essential to the
conduct of directly infringing activities (i.e. reproduction, distribution,
and public display), they made no material contribution to those
activities.51
The majority differentiated payment systems like Visa’s from the
brick-and-mortar swap meet in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, pointing out
that the infringing material in Fonovisa was “physically located in and

46. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that there was inducement in a case involving the operator of a torrent tracker); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that there was material
contribution in a case involving a search engine operator).
47. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1171.
48. See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 675, 680 (2011). Mark Bartholomew and Patrick McArdle argue that tort law’s concept
of causation can potentially be useful to courts deciding contributory infringement claims because
“[b]y tethering liability for the infringing acts of another to causation, courts can offer an
explanation of contributory infringement liability that more closely maps onto social expectations
of fairness and blame.” Id. at 699. The professors also point out, however, that there is significant
confusion in the copyright case law concerning the relationship between tort law principles of
causation and the element of material contribution. See id. at 704–05 (arguing that “the causal
analysis usually becomes confused with other issues of responsibility so that it is often impossible
to determine what causal tests were actually used”).
49. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 798–800 (9th Cir. 2007).
50. See id. at 800 (stating that “[a]ny conception of ‘site and facilities’ that encompasses
Defendants would also include a number of peripherally-involved third parties, such as computer
display companies, storage device companies, and software companies”).
51. Id. at 794 n.1, 797–98.
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traded at [Cherry Auction’s] market.”52 The majority also differentiated
cyberspace “sites” of infringement from Visa’s payment system,
explaining that the P2P file sharing system in A&M Records v. Napster
provided “a centralized place . . . where infringing works could be
collected, sorted, found, and bought, sold, or exchanged.”53 Visa, the
majority said, “[does] not provide users the tools to locate infringing
material, nor does any infringing material ever reside on or pass through
any network or computer [Visa] operate[s].”54 By this logic, Visa’s
payment system is not the “site” of any infringing activity; rather, the
websites for which Visa’s system processed payments are the “sites” of
actual infringing activity.55 On the issue of inducement, the majority held
that Visa in no way designed or promoted its payment system as a means
to infringe copyrights.56 The majority concluded that having “the power
to undermine the commercial viability of infringement” does not
constitute material contribution to infringement or inducement to
infringe.57
2. Contributory Trademark Infringement
An intermediary can be liable for contributory trademark infringement
if it “intentionally induced” an underlying direct infringement or
“continued to supply” either a service or an infringing product to a direct
infringer while knowing of the direct infringement.58 When the
intermediary in question is a service provider rather than a product
supplier, the service provider must exhibit “direct control and monitoring
of the instrumentality” used by the direct infringer to infringe the mark.59
These are higher hurdles for a plaintiff than the knowledge and material
contribution standards in copyright law.60
Having already concluded that Visa was not liable for contributory
copyright infringement, the majority easily concluded that Perfect 10
failed to carry its burden with respect to the more rigorous standards of
trademark law.61 Specifically, Perfect 10 alleged no affirmative acts by
52. Id. at 796.
53. Id. at 799.
54. Id. at 800.
55. Id. at 799.
56. See id. at 801 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913,
925–26 (2005)) (observing that marketing credit cards as a means to pay for goods does not equate
with marketing any specific goods for which people might pay using those credit cards).
57. Id. at 800–02.
58. Id. at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 806 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir.
1996)) (“The tests for secondary trademark infringement are even more difficult to satisfy than
those required to find secondary copyright infringement.”).
61. Id.
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Visa to support a claim that Visa induced its customers to infringe Perfect
10’s marks.62 Moreover, the majority said, echoing its reasoning
concerning what constitutes a “site” of copyright infringement, Visa’s
payment network is not the “instrumentality” through which third parties
infringe Perfect 10’s trademarks.63 The acts of direct infringement alleged
by Perfect 10 occurred on third-party websites whose contents were
beyond Visa’s direct control as a payment processor.64 Those sites, and
not Visa’s payment network, were the instrumentalities of direct
infringement. At best, Visa could only indirectly control conduct on the
sites where the primary infringements were occurring,65 and indirect
control cannot support a finding of liability.
3. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
Turning to vicarious copyright infringement, an online intermediary
can be liable if it had, but declined to exercise, the right and ability to
control or supervise a direct infringer from whose actions it directly
profited.66 The control element of a claim for vicarious copyright
infringement requires both proof that the defendant had the legal right to
control the actions of the direct infringer and proof that the defendant had
the practical ability to do so.67 That element is satisfied, for example, if
the defendant reserves the right in its terms of service to terminate access
for infringing users, and the architecture of the defendant’s system
enables the defendant to locate infringing material.68 There is no scienter
element to a claim of vicarious infringement, which is consonant with the
agency law origins of the cause of action.69 It doesn’t matter whether the
defendant knew what the direct infringer was doing; it matters only
whether the defendant was in a position to control what the direct
infringer was doing. The direct profit or financial benefit element is
satisfied if infringing material is a draw for users or increases the
attractiveness of the defendant’s venue or service.70 No actual pecuniary

62. Id. at 807.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 & n.9 (2005).
67. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n.9).
68. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001).
69. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n.9, 932 (stating that “a vicarious liability
theory . . . allows imposition of liability . . . even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the
infringement”).
70. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
263–64 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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benefit (e.g., a commission on the sale of infringing works) is required.71
To evaluate Perfect 10’s claim for vicarious infringement, the court
had to consider whether the control element is satisfied when a payment
processor has the right and ability to terminate payments to a site on
which direct infringement is occurring, but has no direct control over the
infringing content on the site. Perfect 10 argued that Visa’s terms of
service, which permit it to require member merchants to stop illegal
activity as a condition of their continued receipt of payments, were
sufficient to establish that the payment processor has the right and ability
to control the content on member merchants’ sites.72 The majority
disagreed, drawing a fine line between the ability to exert financial
pressure on a merchant to induce it to alter its conduct and the right and
ability to directly control the merchant’s infringing conduct, which was
the reproduction, alteration, and distribution of Perfect 10’s copyrighted
photographs.73 The dispositive difference, the majority asserted, is
between a payment processor’s ability to affect infringement on thirdparty sites, which it can do, and its ability to actually supervise and
control infringing acts on those sites, which it can’t: “Defendants cannot
take away the software the offending sites use to copy, alter, and
distribute the infringing images, cannot remove those websites from the
Internet, and cannot themselves block the distribution of those images
over the Internet.”74 Fonovisa and Napster, the majority explained, did
not support Perfect 10’s argument because in both of those cases the
defendants “had the right to remove individual infringers from the very
place the infringement was happening.”75 The fact that infringements
occur on Visa’s merchants’ websites instead of on Visa’s payment system
was central to the majority’s reasoning concerning the control element,
as it had been in the analysis of the site and facilities element of
contributory infringement.
4. Vicarious Trademark Infringement
As with standards for contributory infringement, standards for
vicarious infringement differ between copyright and trademark law. For
an intermediary to be vicariously liable for trademark infringement, it
must have acted in apparent or actual partnership with the direct infringer,
and the two must “have authority to bind [each] other in transactions with
third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 804 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 804–05.
Id. at 805.
Id.
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product” or service.76
For the same reasons that the majority rejected Perfect 10’s claim that
Visa had the “right and ability to control” direct copyright infringements
occurring on the accused websites, it rejected the claim that Visa and the
operators of the accused websites exercised joint ownership or control
over the direct trademark infringements.77 In response to Perfect 10’s
allegation that Visa and the website operators were in a “symbiotic
financial partnership,” the majority pointed out that Visa did not share in
the profits of infringement.78 Rather, Visa simply processed payments
and collected standard processing fees for each transaction.79
5. Judge Kozinski’s Dissent
Dissenting with his typical acidity, Judge Kozinski accused the
majority of “slam[ming] the courthouse door in [Perfect 10’s] face.”80 He
found it obvious that “knowingly provid[ing] a financial bridge between
buyers and sellers of pirated works” gives rise to secondary copyright
liability, both contributory and vicarious.81 On the element of material
contribution, he was dismissive of the majority’s attempt to distinguish
payment processors from search engine operators, which he pointed out
can be held contributorily liable under the court’s previous decision in
Amazon.com.82 The majority distinguished payment processors from
search engine operators on the rationale that the latter, as information
location tools, are more essential to infringement.83 But search engine
operators, Judge Kozinski countered, are no more essential than payment
processors to the commission of infringing acts.84 The two types of
intermediaries, he said, are fungible when it comes to the importance of
their roles in facilitating direct infringements.85 Just as search engines
play a substantial role in helping users locate infringing material,
payment processors play a substantial role in helping users buy infringing
76. Id. at 807.
77. Id. at 808.
78. Id. at 807–08.
79. Id. at 808.
80. Id. at 810 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 810–11.
82. Id. at 811 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 797–98 n.8 (majority opinion) (“Because location services lead Internet users
directly to infringing images and often display them on the website of the service itself, we find
that location services are more important and more essential—indeed, more ‘material’—to
infringement than payment services are.”).
84. See id. at 811 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
85. See id. (“If a consumer wishes to buy an infringing image from one of the Stolen
Content Websites, he can do so by using Visa or MasterCard, just as he can use Google to find
the infringing images in the first place.”).
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material: “It’s not possible to distribute by sale without receiving
compensation, so payment is in fact part of the infringement process.”86
He concluded that processing payment for infringing images “is not just
an economic incentive for infringement; it’s an essential step in the
infringement process.”87 Thus, because payment processors are central to
infringement, holding them liable would not risk sliding down a slippery
slope that leads to liability for peripheral intermediaries.88
On the question of right and ability to control, Judge Kozinski agreed
with Perfect 10 that Visa’s terms of service give it both the contractual
right to require merchants to cease illegal activities on their sites and the
practical ability to do so.89 By his reasoning, control of the mechanics of
transferring infringing material is not necessary to satisfy the control
element because payment and distribution are inextricably linked: “In a
commercial environment, distribution and payment are (to use a quaint
anachronism) like love and marriage—you can’t have one without the
other. If cards don’t process payment, pirates don’t deliver booty.”90
Moreover, he said, if the ability to control is understood as the court
defined it in Amazon.com—not just the ability to stop infringement but
also the ability to limit it—then payment processors have that ability
because withdrawing financial support from a website threatens its
continued viability even if the site can survive.91 Judge Kozinski accused
the majority of substituting the “practical ability” test from Amazon.com
for an “absolute right to stop” standard.92 He saw no principled way,
following the court’s decision in Amazon.com, to let payment processors
off the hook for failing to exercise their contractual right to require
merchants to stop directly infringing.93
With respect to Visa’s secondary liability under trademark law, Judge
Kozinski was no less scathing in his criticism of the majority’s reasoning
86. Id. at 814.
87. Id. at 812.
88. See id. at 816 (“Were we to rule for plaintiff, as we should, I have every confidence that
future courts would be able to distinguish this case when and if they are confronted with lawsuits
against utility companies, software vendors and others who provide incidental services to
infringers.”).
89. Id. at 816–17 (“[T]he cards have the authority, given to them by contract, to force the
Stolen Content Websites to remove infringing images from their inventory as a condition for using
defendants’ payment systems. If the merchants comply, their websites stop peddling stolen
content and so infringement is stopped or limited.”).
90. Id. at 818.
91. See id. at 818–19 (emphasizing that “[t]he standard is ‘stop or limit’ the infringing
conduct” and positing that the difficulty of receiving payment for selling unlawful products will
dramatically affect a website’s operations).
92. Id. at 818.
93. See id.
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and conclusions.94 He found the requisite “control and monitoring”
elements to support Perfect 10’s claim of contributory infringement in
Visa’s ability to approve or deny the processing of any given payment.95
And whereas the majority saw no “symbiotic partnership” between Visa
and the operators of the accused websites for purposes of establishing
vicarious liability,96 Judge Kozinski asserted that payment processors like
Visa reap “huge profits” from processing payments for infringing and
counterfeit goods.97 “If this is not symbiosis,” he asked, “what is?”98
6. Making Sense of the Split Decision
The majority and the dissent in Visa are painstakingly reasoned,
minutely responsive to each other, and about as diametrically opposed as
two lines of reasoning on the same issues can possibly be. For as plausible
as Judge Kozinski’s dissent was, and for as strained as the majority’s
efforts were to avoid Amazon.com by distinguishing search engine
operators from payment processors, the majority’s decision is both
legible and defensible as a matter of fairness and innovation policy.99
The majority declined to subject Visa and its co-defendants to liability
for secondary copyright infringements from which they could not have
insulated themselves by complying with the safe harbor provisions in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).100 Although Congress
drafted the DMCA’s safe harbors with the intention of letting the courts
develop secondary liability doctrines for online intermediaries,101
Congress also designed the safe harbors “to facilitate the robust
development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce.”102 The
omission of payment processors, which are the lynchpin of e-commerce,
from the DMCA’s safe harbor framework suggests that Congress neither
94. Id. at 822.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 808 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 822–23 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 823.
99. Cf. Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 48, at 711 (referring to the majority’s analysis
as “tortured” and arguing that it would have been preferable for the majority to base its holding
explicitly on policy considerations).
100. The DMCA’s safe harbors cover online service providers engaged in specific activities
that may implicate infringing materials: routing and transmission, system caching, storing
material at the direction of users, and hypertext linking. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012).
Payment processing is not a covered activity. See id.
101. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998) (“Rather than embarking upon a wholesale
clarification of these doctrines, the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state
and, instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common activities of service
providers.”).
102. Id. at 1.
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contemplated nor foresaw that copyright’s secondary liability doctrines
could stretch far enough to encompass them.103 It seems highly unlikely
that Congress would have intentionally excluded payment processors
from safe harbor, given their importance to the expansion of e-commerce.
In Amazon.com, Google was able to assert the DMCA’s section 512(d)
safe harbor for information location tools.104 In Visa, by contrast, the
defendant payment processors could not have invoked any section 512
safe harbor, leaving them wide open to crippling statutory damages.105
That fact made a difference to the majority, which was concerned that
secondary liability for payment processors would have a chilling effect
on e-commerce.106 It made no difference whatsoever to Judge Kozinski,
who viewed payment processors not as the engine of e-commerce but as
“marauders who pilfer the property of law-abiding, tax-paying rights
holders, and who turn consumers into recipients of stolen property.”107
He was equally unmoved by the prospect that ineligibility for safe harbor
puts payment processors in an unfair bind.108
It is undoubtedly true, as Mark Bartholomew and Patrick McArdle
have argued, that the split decision in Visa highlights the instability
inherent in secondary infringement doctrines and the extent to which that
instability predisposes secondary infringement analyses to

103. Payment processors were active online intermediaries at the time Congress was drafting
the DMCA. Credit card payments were accepted on the Internet as early as 1994. See Jacqueline
Day, Internet Commerce Kicks Off, BANK SYS. & TECH., Dec. 1994, at 12, 14. In 1996, there was
a total of $347 million in credit card transactions on the Internet, and rapid growth in e-commerce
was projected as security for online transactions improved, causing consumer confidence to
increase. See John N. Frank, In Quest of CyberGold, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Aug. 1996, at 48.
104. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google
claims that it qualifies for the limitations on liability set forth in . . . § 512. In particular, [§] 512(d)
limits the liability of a service provider ‘for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider
referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity,
by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext
link’ if the service provider meets certain criteria.”).
105. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 796 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that Perfect 10 sought the “anomalous result” of holding Visa liable for third-party
infringements that it could not have protected itself from by claiming safe harbor, both because it
was not an eligible “service provider” within the meaning of the DMCA and because it lacked the
ability to remove infringing content from its merchants’ sites).
106. See id. at 794 (“We evaluate Perfect 10’s claims with an awareness that credit cards
serve as the primary engine of electronic commerce and that Congress has determined it to be the
policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
107. Id. at 824 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 824 n.25 (asserting matter-of-factly that “there is no anomaly in treating
parties that are covered by the statute differently from those that are not”).
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unacknowledged policy-driven rationales.109 It is also true, however, that
policy considerations have a legitimate role to play when claimants invite
courts to expand existing common law liability doctrines beyond their
recognized scope. As a practical matter, Visa marked the end of the road
for rights owners’ efforts to use secondary liability rules to compel
payment processors to stop the flow of money to alleged “Stolen Content
Websites.” In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Perfect 10’s petition
for certiorari, letting the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in favor of Visa
stand.110 No one has re-litigated the issue since, and rights owners
strategically shifted their attention in the wake of Visa to other regulatory
venues in pursuit of their “follow the money” enforcement agenda.
B. In Congress: The Shadow of Potential Law
Between 2010 and 2011, members of Congress introduced three bills
containing provisions requiring payment processors and other online
intermediaries to block so-called foreign infringing or rogue sites: the
Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act (COICA),111 the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA),112 and the Protect Intellectual Property
Act (PIPA).113 The sound recording and motion picture industries lobbied
aggressively for all three.114 COICA didn’t get much attention beyond the
Beltway, but SOPA and PIPA ignited a media firestorm and public outcry
that will not soon be forgotten on Capitol Hill:
Online opposition to the two bills coalesced quickly as word
spread that SOPA/PIPA contained provisions requiring the
blacklisting of websites. In an open letter to Congress,
109. See Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 48, at 710–11 (arguing that the Visa majority
should have “acknowledge[d] that the Amazon.com decision relied on public policy, not the
‘materiality’ of the search engine’s conduct, and then explain[ed], again on public policy grounds,
why online credit card services should not be part of the ‘simple measures’ rule for online
contributory infringement”).
110. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 553 U.S. 1079 (2008).
111. Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act (COICA), S. 3804, 111th Cong.
(2010).
112. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
113. Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
114. See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, MPAA/RIAA Lobbied Extensively in Favor of Domain
Seizures, TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 19, 2010), https://torrentfreak.com/mpaariaa-lobbiedextensively-in-favor-of-domain-seizures-101219/ (reporting that the Recording Industry
Association of America and MPAA spent more than $1.8 million in the third quarter of 2010 on
lobbying efforts directly targeted at COICA and related site-blocking enforcement measures);
Daniel Nasaw, Who Backs the Anti-Piracy Laws?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-us-canada-16603870 (reporting on support for SOPA
and PIPA by “the largest film, television, music recording and book publishing companies and
trade associations in the US”).
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Google co-founder Sergey Brin and other prominent Internet
entrepreneurs asserted that the legislation would give the
U.S. government “power to censor the web using techniques
similar to those used by China . . . and Iran.” Contributing to
and marshaling web-roots resistance, the operators of
Wikipedia made the unprecedented decision to “go dark” in
protest for one day—January 18, 2012. In addition to
Wikipedia, more than 100,000 Internet companies, including
Google, Mozilla, Reddit, and I Can Has Cheezburger (of
LOLcats fame), joined the one-day protest. Their forms of
protest varied, but their message to their users and fans was
unitary: “Petition your elected representatives to oppose
these bills.” And petition their representatives people did—
in droves. Google reported that 4.5 million people in one day
signed its petition opposing SOPA and PIPA.115
The provisions in the bills that became lightning rods for criticism
were those requiring domain name system (DNS) authorities in the
United States to prevent domain names associated with “rogue sites”
from resolving to their designated Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.116
Network engineers predicted that government orders to U.S.-based DNS
authorities to block certain websites would lead some of the more
sophisticated parties hosting those sites to create splinter or parallel
systems for resolving domain names, thus fragmenting the unified
structure of the DNS, on which the integrity of the Internet’s global
addressing system depends.117 Such fragmentation, the bills’ opponents
asserted, would effectively “break the Internet.”118
The provisions impacting payment processors attracted little
115. Annemarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A
Discourse-Theoretic Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153,
159 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
116. See COICA, S. 3804 § 2 (as introduced in the Senate); SOPA, H.R. 3261 § 102; PIPA,
S. 968 § 3.
117. See, e.g., Paul Vixie, On Mandated Content Blocking in the Domain Name System,
CIRCLEID (Mar 18, 2011, 12:14 PM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20110318_on_mandated_
content_blocking_in_the_domain_name_system/ (“My greatest worry is what people will do to
bypass all this junk or to prevent other people from bypassing it. My fellow humans are a proud
and occasionally adversarial bunch and they don’t like being told what they can't do or what they
have to do. The things we’ll all be doing to bypass the local DNS restrictions imposed by our
coffee shops or our governments or our ISPs will break everything. Where this ends is with
questions like ‘which DNS system are you using?’ and ‘which DNS systems is your TLD in?’
which in other words means that where this ends is a world without universal naming.”).
118. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the Internet, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011) (“Directing the remedial power of the courts towards the
Internet’s core technical infrastructure in this sledgehammer fashion has impact far beyond
intellectual property rights enforcement—it threatens the fundamental principle of
interconnectivity that is at the very heart of the Internet.”).
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attention, but they were an integral part of the bills’ comprehensive,
multi-intermediary approach to eliminating targeted sites from the
Internet.119 The relevant provisions were virtually identical across the
three pieces of legislation: COICA required “a financial transaction
provider” to “take reasonable measures . . . to prevent . . . its service from
processing transactions for customers located within the United States
based on purchases associated with the domain name; and . . . its
trademarks from being authorized for use on Internet sites associated with
such domain name.”120 SOPA required “a payment network
provider . . . [to] take technically feasible and reasonable measures . . . to
prevent, prohibit, or suspend its service from completing payment
transactions involving customers located within the United States . . . and
the payment account . . . which is used by the foreign infringing site.”121
PIPA required “a financial transaction provider . . . [to] take reasonable
measures . . . designed to prevent, prohibit, or suspend its service from
completing payment transactions involving customers located within the
United States and the Internet site associated with the [targeted] domain
name.”122
It is difficult to predict how COICA, SOPA, and PIPA would have
fared had they not contained the controversial DNS provisions that
ultimately doomed them. Responses to the legislation among the major
payment processors were divided, with a majority opposed.123
MasterCard’s Head of Franchise Development and Customer
Performance Integrity testified in favor of SOPA at the House Judiciary
Committee hearing, stating for the record that “MasterCard ha[d] forged
strong working relationships with rights holders and their trade
associations” and was then “working with [IPEC] in the development of
industry best practices to address copyright infringement and the sale of
119. Other intermediaries required to engage in blocking were search engine operators and
online advertising networks. See, e.g., SOPA, H.R. 3261 § 102 (prohibiting search engines from
returning links to targeted sites in search results and advertising services from serving
advertisements alongside the content on such sites).
120. COICA, S. 3804 § 2.
121. SOPA, H.R. 3261 § 102.
122. PIPA, S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
123. See List of Supporters and Opponents of H.R. 3261, OPENCONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr3261-112/bill_positions (last visited July 5, 2015) (noting
Visa’s support for and PayPal’s opposition to SOPA); see also Brett Greene, SOPA and PIPA
Bills Threaten Job Creation and Innovation, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2012, 5:12 AM),
https://secure.huffingtonpost.com/brett-greene/sopa-and-pipa-billsthrea_b_1204825.html (recognizing American Express, Discover, and PayPal’s opposition to
SOPA and PIPA); Connor Adams Sheets, SOPA Supporters: Companies and Groups That
Support the Controversial Bill, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2012, 9:46 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/sopa-supporters-companies-groups-support-controversial-bill-391250
(observing Visa and MasterCard’s support for SOPA).
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counterfeit products over the Internet.”124 Although MasterCard was the
only payment processor to make a public statement to that effect, many
others were then participating in a parallel executive-branch effort to
secure their cooperation as copyright and trademark enforcers. That effort
resulted in the voluntary best practices agreement discussed at length in
Part II below. The document, dated May 16, 2011—more than five
months before SOPA was introduced in the House of Representatives—
carried the endorsement of five major payment processors.125 To the
extent that the threat of command-and-control intervention created a
regulatory environment conducive to the conclusion of a more flexible,
non-binding voluntary agreement—and it seems fair to infer that it did—
that threat was embodied in COICA.
C. In the White House: IPEC and the Paradox of Non-Regulatory
Regulation
IPEC has prodded all of the online intermediaries that would have
been subject to the mandatory blocking provisions in COICA, SOPA, and
PIPA—payment processors, search engines, domain name registry
operators (i.e., Internet service providers), and online advertising
networks—to implement equivalent blocking protocols through
voluntary agreements. In its first Joint Strategic Plan (JSP), published in
2010, IPEC announced its intent to “encourage” private-sector
cooperation to reduce online infringement and counterfeiting:
The Administration encourages cooperative efforts within the
business community to reduce Internet piracy. The
Administration believes that it is essential for the private sector,
including content owners, Internet service providers,
advertising brokers, payment processors and search engines, to
work collaboratively, consistent with the antitrust laws, to
address activity that has a negative economic impact and
undermines U.S. businesses, and to seek practical and efficient
solutions to address infringement. This should be achieved
through carefully crafted and balanced agreements.126

124. Stop Online Piracy Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R. on H.R. 3261,
112th Cong. 82–83, 85 (2011) [hereinafter SOPA Hearing] (statement of Linda Kirkpatrick,
Group Head, Customer Performance Integrity, MasterCard Worldwide).
125. See Best Practices to Address Copyright Infringement and the Sale of Counterfeit
Products on the Internet (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Best Practices for Payment Processors] (on
file with author) (listing American Express, Discover, MasterCard, PayPal, and Visa as
participating payment processors).
126. 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 17 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 JSP], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty_strategic_plan.pdf.
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The 2011 JSP recapitulated the theme of voluntary cooperation but
asserted a more active, facilitative role for IPEC in the process:
Since the release of the Strategy, we have facilitated and
encouraged dialogue among the different private sector
Internet intermediaries that contribute to the dynamic nature
and functioning of the Internet, including payment
processors, search engines, and domain name registrars and
registries. These entities can support efforts by rightholders
and law enforcement to reduce online infringement in a
manner consistent with our commitment to the principles of
fair process, freedom of expression and other important
public policy objectives. We believe that most companies
share the view that providing services to infringing sites is
inconsistent with good corporate business practice, and we
are beginning to see several companies take the lead in
pursuing voluntary cooperative action.127
In 2012, IPEC was more specific about the nature of the cooperation
it encouraged, cloaking references to website blocking—a four-letter
word following the SOPA and PIPA debates—in the language of
epidemiology and contagion control: “We have facilitated voluntary
agreements to ‘quarantine’ sites engaged in counterfeiting and piracy by
working cooperatively with credit card companies, domain name
registrars, and online advertisers.”128
In its 2013 JSP, IPEC boasted a number of successes in the realm of
“facilitating” voluntary agreements, including the best practices
agreement for payment processors, the creation of the Center for Safe
Internet Pharmacies “to combat fake online ‘pharmacies’ selling
dangerous illegal drugs over the Internet,” the graduated response MOU
between broadband providers and rights owners, and a “leadership
pledge” by advertisers “to not support online piracy and counterfeiting
with advertising revenue.”129 Coming quickly on the heels of the

127. 2011 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN 5 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_
anniversary_report.pdf.
128. 2012 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN ii (2012), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_twoyear_anniversary_report.pdf.
129. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 1, 35–36
(2013) [hereinafter 2013 JSP], available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-plan.pdf.
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leadership pledge by advertisers was a voluntary best practices agreement
for advertising networks.130
The precise nature of IPEC’s facilitation of voluntary agreements is
unclear; however, the very fact that the government convenes and
participates in negotiations over such agreements calls their voluntariness
into question.131 IPEC characterizes its approach to private-sector
cooperation as a “voluntary, non-regulatory” one,132 but that is an
oversimplification. The approach is certainly non-regulatory in the literal
sense: it has produced no new public laws, and there is no public record
of IPEC’s involvement in the negotiation of any of the voluntary
agreements for which it has taken credit. It is regulatory, however, in the
very real sense that the government is playing an active role in the
formation of “sticky” (and sometimes legally binding) industrial norms.
Julia Black’s distinction between voluntary self-regulation and coerced
self-regulation is fitting in this context.133 IPEC regards “best practices”
intellectual property enforcement agreements as a form of voluntary selfregulation, but calling an agreement voluntary doesn’t make it so. If the
administration’s approach were truly non-regulatory, then IPEC would
not act as a midwife to these agreements and publicly claim credit when
they are born. Moreover, IPEC makes specific legislative
recommendations in its annual JSPs, which means that the shadow of
potential law hangs perennially over the private-sector conversations that
it facilitates.134 In light of these realities, it is more honest to classify
voluntary agreements as a form of regulation by arm-twisting.135
Adding further to the regulatory ambiguity surrounding voluntary
agreements, IPEC’s 2013 JSP directed the U.S. Patent and Trademark

130. See Espinel, supra note 21 (announcing that “24/7 Media, Adtegrity, AOL, Condé Nast,
Google, Microsoft, SpotXchange, and Yahoo!, with the support of the Interactive Advertising
Bureau, committed to a set of best practices to address online infringement by reducing the flow
of ad revenue to operators of [rogue] sites”).
131. See, e.g., 2013 JSP, supra note 129, at 35–36.
132. Id. at 36.
133. See supra text accompanying note 23 (explaining Black’s regulatory taxonomy).
134. See, e.g., 2010 JSP, supra note 126, at 22 (including a “Comprehensive Review of
Existing Intellectual Property Laws to Determine Needed Legislative Changes” in a list of “Action
Items”); ADMINISTRATION’S WHITE PAPER ON INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT LEGIS.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1–3
(2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ip_white_paper.pdf (recommending twenty-three
changes to existing laws to enhance enforcement efforts).
135. See Ronald J. Mann, Emerging Frameworks for Policing Internet Intermediaries, 10 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 8 (2006) (“In practice, regulators have become increasingly adept at securing
voluntary agreements, apparently out of the payment intermediaries’ desire to forestall more
intrusive regulation.”).
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Office (USPTO) to conduct an official study to assess their efficacy.136
Less than three months after that study began, the House Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Internet held a hearing on the same subject,137 signaling coordination
between the two branches and an official expectation, however vague, of
measurable results. In his opening statement at the House hearing,
Representative Mel Watt was candid about the causal relationship
between threatened regulation and private-sector voluntarism: “We are
certainly not here to relitigate SOPA,” he said, “but I do believe that the
SOPA debate . . . helped motivate an important shift in the willingness of
some parties to engage more aggressively in negotiating . . . some of the
best practices we are considering here today.”138 “Indeed,” he continued,
“some of the entities that fought vigorously to defeat SOPA are now
constructive parties to voluntary agreements designed to combat the drain
on our economy . . . that online piracy and counterfeiting represent.”139
As the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) acknowledged
with equal candor in comments submitted for the USPTO study, “a
party’s willingness to commit to a particular practice will depend to a
significant degree on what it perceives to be the legal consequence (or
lack thereof) of continuing its current course of action, and not
committing to any voluntary agreement.”140 The regulatory dynamic is
implicit but clear: volunteer or be compelled.
When the government takes so active an interest in the negotiation and
performance of private-sector agreements as it has taken in the online
intellectual property enforcement space, the line between public and
private law becomes blurred in ways that may ultimately undermine
desired regulatory outcomes. In its comments for the USPTO study, the
Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA) questioned
both the basis for and the wisdom of de facto governmental oversight of
private-sector agreements:

136. See Request of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for Public
Comments: Voluntary Best Practices Study, 78 Fed. Reg. 37210 (June 20, 2013).
137. Role of Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. Intellectual Property System: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary
H.R., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Role of Voluntary Agreements], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/ (search for 113-49).
138. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Mel Watt, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
139. Id.
140. Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America in Response to Request of the
USPTO for Public Comments: Voluntary Best Practices Study 2 (Aug. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/PTO-C-2013-0036.pdf.
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The [IPEC JSP] provided no indication of the basis for this
directive; rather, it proceeded from the unexamined premise
that the U.S. Government should be evaluating unregulated,
private sector action in the first place. This proposal itself
deserves additional consideration. Depending on the nature
of the evaluation, industry stakeholders may perceive
government assessments as a form of soft regulation. Should
government evaluation be perceived as imposing regulatory
compliance burdens, it will deter participation in “voluntary
best practices,” particularly if policymakers should
characterize one given effort as superior to another, toward
meeting some yet-unstated metric. Such evaluation may also
be perceived as setting a minimum bar of regulatory
compliance necessary for market entry.141
The CCIA’s comments highlight the potentially distorting and
counterproductive effects of coerced self-regulation on the affected actors
and markets. If, as a regulatory reality, voluntary best practices
agreements are voluntary in name only, Internet intermediaries may be
willing to roll the dice on what the MPAA calls “improvements in the
law,”142 especially after the spectacular demise of SOPA and PIPA.
Despite IPEC’s assertion that its approach to securing cooperation
from online intermediaries is non-regulatory, the administration can’t
seem to decide if it is engaged in regulation or not when it “facilitates”
the formation of voluntary agreements. In response to a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request for documents relating to the negotiation
of the best practices agreement for payment processors, IPEC identified
more than sixty responsive documents in its possession but declined to
produce a single one, citing, inter alia, the deliberative process privilege
in Exemption 5.143 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “the
general purpose of [Exemption 5] is to prevent injury to the quality of
agency decisions.”144 The cases establish two criteria, both of which must
be met, for invoking the deliberative process privilege to deny a FOIA
141. Comments of the Computer & Communications Indus. Association in Response to
Request of the USPTO for Public Comments: Voluntary Best Practices Study 1 (Aug. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/PTO-C-2013-0036.pdf.
142. See Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 140, at 3.
143. See Letter from Dionne Hardy, Office of Management & Budget, to Diana Gleason
(Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with author) (stating that “[w]e are withholding . . . various drafts of such
agreement and other related documents under FOIA Exemption 4 and FOIA Exemption
5. Exemption 5 protects interagency and intra-agency pre-decisional, deliberative materials, the
disclosure of which would inhibit the frank and candid exchange of views that is necessary for
effective government decision-making” (citation omitted)).
144. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 5, at
13 (2009 ed.) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption5.pdf.
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request: First, the requested document must be pre-decisional, meaning
that it is “antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.”145 Second, the
document must be deliberative, meaning that it is “a direct part of the
deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses
opinions on legal or policy matters.”146 For documents in IPEC’s hands
relating to the negotiation of the best practices agreement for payment
processors, the first criterion is clearly not met because the documents are
not antecedent to the adoption of any agency policy. IPEC’s refusal to
disclose the documents, however, amounts to an assertion that they were
implicated in the formation of public policy.147 And that assertion runs
counter to IPEC’s representation that its approach to securing
intermediaries’ cooperation is non-regulatory. The dissonance reflects
the ambiguous status of IPEC-facilitated voluntary agreements and the
need for the government to get its regulatory story straight vis-à-vis both
the public and the intermediaries whose cooperation it seeks.
II. HOW PAYMENT BLOCKADES WORK: “BEST PRACTICES TO ADDRESS
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND THE SALE OF COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS
ON THE INTERNET”
The voluntary best practices agreement for payment processors is
actually a two-sided proposition, insofar as it incorporates a
complementary set of best practices for rights owners.148 The
participating payment processors named in the agreement are American
Express, Discover, MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal.149 There are no named
rights owners in the agreement, but according to a report prepared for
IPEC by the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC), which
administers the agreement, there are thirty-one participating rights
owners, including manufacturers of apparel, shoes, luxury goods,
electronics, cars, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, software, and consumer
products.150 The two sets of best practices were adopted, respectively, in

145. Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
147. After a lapse of time beyond what FOIA permits, multiple phone calls to the relevant
FOIA officer, and additional written requests explaining why the asserted exemptions were
inapplicable, IPEC eventually produced the responsive documents in its possession.
148. See Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125; Best Practices for RightsHolders with Payment Processors (July 2011) [hereinafter Best Practices for Rights-Holders] (on
file with author).
149. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 1.
150. See KRISTINA MONTANARO, INTL ANTICOUNTERFEITING COAL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
IACC PAYMENT PROCESSOR PORTAL PROGRAM: FIRST YEAR STATISTICAL REVIEW 3 (2012)
[hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at http://www.gacg.org/Content/Upload/
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May and July 2011.151 They were implemented in January 2012 with the
launch of the Payment Processor Initiative, an inter-industry enforcement
effort run by the IACC and marketed under the trademark
“RogueBlock.”152 Following the program’s initial implementation, the
number of participating payment processors expanded to include PULSE
and Diners Club.153
The IACC’s role in administering the Payment Processor Initiative is
roughly analogous to the role the Center for Copyright Information plays
in administering the CAS.154 Similar to the graduated response protocol
in the CAS, to which broadband users become bound through terms of
service with their providers, the enforcement protocol in the best
practices agreement becomes binding on merchants through payment
processors’ policies, which prohibit the use of card services for illegal
transactions.155 There is, however, a very important difference between
the voluntary best practices agreement for payment processors and the
MOU that created the CAS: the best practices agreement is, by its express
terms, not legally binding on the participating parties.156 Although the
terms of the agreement are sufficiently specific to be enforced, the parties
disclaim contractual intent.
A. The Protocol for Payment Processors
At the core of the best practices agreement for payment processors is
a notice-and-termination protocol. The protocol is operationalized
through the RogueBlock “Portal Program,” a web-based software system
MemberNewsDocs/October%202012%20Report%20to%20IPEC%20-%20FINAL.pdf
(describing the program).
151. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 1; Best Practices for RightsHolders, supra note 148, at 1.
152. IACC
Payment
Processor
Initiative
(RogueBlock®),
IACC,
http://www.iacc.org/rogueblock.html (last visited July 5, 2015) [hereinafter RogueBlock] (“The
initiative launched in January 2012, following rights-holder negotiations with the payment
industry to develop a set of best practices in addressing rogue websites, as encouraged by the U.S.
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, Victoria Espinel.”).
153. See Payment Processor Initiative & Portal Program: Innovation from Partnership,
IACC, [hereinafter Payment Processor Initiative & Portal Program], https://web.archive.org/web
/20130119105913/http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/members.iacc.org/resource/resmgr/IACC_Payment
ProcessorInitiat.pdf (last visited July 5, 2015) (listing participating payment processors).
154. See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 22, at 27–28 (explaining the role of the
Center for Copyright Information).
155. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 3 (“The Portal Program is dependent on
Card Network policies, which prohibit merchants from using card services for illegal transactions.
Use of card services for sales of counterfeit or pirated goods constitutes a breach of these policies,
and thus provides for remediation of the corresponding merchant account.”).
156. See Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 4 (“These best practices
are voluntary and not legally binding.”).
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for managing communications between rights owners and payment
processors concerning alleged “rogue sites.”157 Rights owners pay annual
fees for access to the program.158 The program’s front end is a secure
online portal through which participating rights owners submit
complaints containing information specified in the best practices
agreement.159 The portal provides a standardized, fillable web form for
this purpose.160 The program limits rights owners to “a maximum of
twenty-five complaints per month.”161 On the back end of the program,
the IACC reviews complaints and relays them to the relevant payment
processor, which takes action as specified in the best practices
agreement.162 The payment processor then reports back to the IACC
about the outcome of each complaint.163 Rights owners can track the
status of complaints and view outcomes via the online portal.164
A complaint from a rights owner under the agreement must contain
four elements to be actionable: (1) a description of the alleged
infringement and the “Illegitimate Products,” including the identity of the
website in question; (2) evidence that infringing products are available
on the website using the payment processor’s services (e.g., a screenshot
of a payment processor’s logo on the site); (3) a copy of a cease-anddesist letter or DMCA notice from the rights owner notifying the
website’s owner of the allegation of infringement, or an attestation that,
to the best of the rights owner’s knowledge, the site is not licensed or
authorized to distribute the products; and (4) evidence that the requester
owns the copyright or trademark in question.165 If the payment processor
requires additional information concerning the complaint, the rights
owner must provide the information promptly.166 The agreement does not
require test transactions as part of the complaint submission.167 Nor does
the agreement require any pre-complaint direct communication between
the rights owner and the accused merchant.

157. See RogueBlock, supra note 152.
158. Payment Processor Initiative & Portal Program, supra note 153 (stating that the annual
fee for participation in the program is $6000, and that the setup and maintenance fee is $3900).
159. Id.
160. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 5 (reproducing a screen shot of the
standardized form).
161. Id. at 4.
162. See Payment Processor Initiative & Portal Program, supra note 153.
163. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 7.
164. See Payment Processor Initiative & Portal Program, supra note 153.
165. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 1–2.
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id. at 1.
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Upon receiving a complaint, the payment processor must conduct an
investigation.168 If the payment processor is of a type that deals only
indirectly with merchants through banks known as acquirers, which
recruit merchants into card programs, then the relevant acquirer is
responsible for conducting the investigation.169 MasterCard and Visa are
structured in this way.170 For payment processors that interface directly
with merchants (e.g., PayPal, Diners Club, and American Express), the
payment processor is itself responsible for conducting the
investigation.171 Once a party files a complaint, the agreement puts the
onus on the accused merchant to produce “credible evidence” that it is
not engaged in infringing transactions.172 If the merchant fails to respond
or doesn’t meet its burden, or if the party conducting the investigation
“determines in its reasonable opinion that the merchant is engaged in
sales of Illegitimate Products,” then the merchant must block future
infringing transactions.173 If the merchant continues to engage in such
transactions, then the payment processor or the acquiring bank “shall
suspend or terminate payment services to that merchant with United
States account holders.”174 The agreement contemplates additional
“appropriate remedial measures” but does not specify them.175
Termination is the typical sanction, as revealed in the IACC’s FAQ for
the Portal Program:


What happens after a violation is reported?
First, the IACC staff confirms that your Claim Report
includes all the data necessary to proceed. Once that is
done, a Trace Message176 will be initiated to help

168. Id. at 2.
169. Systems structured in this way are known as four-party, or open, payment systems,
because they operate through relationships with consumer-facing issuing banks (a.k.a. issuers)
and merchant-facing acquiring banks (a.k.a. acquirers). See id. at 3. Issuing banks issue payment
cards to consumers, and acquiring banks enroll merchants into card programs. Id. In a four-party
system, the payment processor has no direct relationship with either merchants or cardholders. Id.
170. See id.
171. PayPal, Diners Club, and American Express are three-party, or closed, payment systems
because they interface directly with merchants and consumers. See id. In a three-party system, the
payment processor issues cards, recruits merchants, and processes transactions. Id.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 3.
176. For clarification,
[a] ‘trace message’ is an attempt to make an online purchase using a valid, yet
set-to-decline credit card. It is similar to a test purchase, but because the payment
is declined, no goods are delivered. The purpose of a trace message is to assist
the Card Network in identifying the merchant account associated with the
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identify the merchant processing for the rogue
website. . . .


How do I know the results of my submitted claims?
The information received back from the Trace Message
will identify the merchant processing the transactions.
Typically, that merchant is then terminated—though in
some cases, the offending content can be
removed. . . .177

In 2013, the IACC reported that 26,000 payment channels178 identified
on 7500 accused websites and more than 2100 individual merchant
accounts had been terminated.179
For merchants who believe they have been wrongly sanctioned, the
agreement requires payment processors to “have a process in place to
allow for prompt review of remedial measures.”180 The agreement is
silent, however, as to what or how much process is due when a merchant
requests a review. No provision exists for third-party review or for a stay
of termination pending resolution of the review.181 In cases where the
merchant disputes termination and the payment processor or acquiring
bank reasonably concludes that the accused merchant is operating
legitimately, the agreement implicitly contemplates that the payment
processor may nevertheless impose or sustain termination if the rights
owner is willing to indemnify it for any resulting legal liability.182 As
[accused] website.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 6 n.5.
177. Payment Processor Initiative & Portal Program, supra note 153 (emphasis added).
178. A website has multiple payment channels if it accepts cards or payments from multiple
payment processors. See Liz Gulsvig, What’s a Payment Channel?, FORTE BLOG (May 5, 2014),
https://www.forte.net/blog/whats-payment-channel/ (“A payment channel is basically any way
that a customer might make a payment or anywhere that you (as a merchant) might accept a
payment.”).
179. See Role of Voluntary Agreements, supra note 137, at 56 (written testimony of Robert
C. Barchiesi, President, IACC).
180. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 3.
181. This is in contrast with the CAS, which provides for a stay of sanctions pending review.
See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 22, at 53–54 (explaining the process for appealing a
mitigation measure in the CAS).
182. See Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 3 (“A Payment System
Operator may request a written agreement by the Right Holder to support the Payment System
Operator fully in connection with a dispute where, in the Payment System Operator’s reasonable
opinion, the merchant provides credible evidence supportive of the merchant’s position that it is
not engaged in illegal conduct, including by defending, holding harmless and indemnifying the
Payment System Operator for any costs, expenses (including legal fees) or liabilities arising in
connection with such dispute.”).
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discussed more fully in Section II.B below, this risk-shifting provision
effectively gives the complaining rights owner final say over termination
decisions. As of October 2012, no complaints submitted through the
Portal Program had been disputed.183
B. The Protocol for Rights Owners
The first best practice to which rights owners agree on their side of
the bargain is that they will operate in good faith in identifying culpable
websites.184 The remaining best practices for rights owners are directed
to streamlining the logistics of the notice-and-termination protocol
described above.185 Rights owners that are members of trade associations
must channel their notices through those trade associations, which are
designated as “channeling associations.”186 Channeling associations are
expected to consolidate notices before presenting them to payment
processors.187 For cases in which a payment processor requires additional
information, rights owners must designate a single point of contact and
respond expeditiously to requests for additional information.188
Participating channeling associations agree to develop and use a
standardized form or system for submitting complaints and a
standardized coding system to identify different types of infringement,
such as “unauthorized copyright download, unauthorized copyright
streaming, counterfeit goods, [and] circumvention devices.”189 For
accused sites that accept payments from more than one payment
processor, channeling associations are expected to provide concurrent
notice, when possible, to all of the implicated payment processors, so that
each is aware of the others’ investigations.190
To all appearances, the IACC’s Portal Program was purpose-built to
operationalize the agreement, and the IACC single-handedly fulfills the
protocol’s channeling function for the large number of corporate
trademark and copyright owners that are its members.191 The IACC’s
member trademark owners include frequently knocked-off luxury brands
such as Coach, Louis Vuitton Malletier, and Hermes.192 The member
copyright owners include the major recording labels and their trade
183. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 12.
184. Best Practices for Rights-Holders, supra note 148, at 1.
185. See id. at 1–2.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2.
191. For a complete list of the IACC’s members, see Member Brand Owners, IACC,
http://www.iacc.org/member_brands.html (last visited July 5, 2015).
192. Id.
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association (the RIAA), the major movie studios and their trade
association (the MPAA), and the major entertainment software
distributors and their trade association (the ESA).193 To view the
extensive list of corporate rights owners that belong to the IACC is to
appreciate the rationale for channeling in the best practices framework;
without it, the protocol would be unmanageably inefficient.
III. SOME NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
As voluntary enforcement agreements multiply at the urging of
Congress and IPEC, advocates of balance and transparency in the
intellectual property system have reason to be vigilant about their impacts
on public access to physical and digital products online. The
intermediaries that are parties to these agreements collectively exercise
tremendous control over the Internet’s universe of accessible content. If
the agreements and their notice-and-sanction protocols were guaranteed
to reach only “Illegitimate Products” and their purveyors, there would be
no cause for concern. Because there is no such guarantee, however, and
because the very point of these agreements is to facilitate the fast removal
of large quantities of content, the protocols themselves should incorporate
robust checks for preventing overreach and mistake. This Part considers
the nature and adequacy of those checks to prevent extraterritorial
application of expansive U.S. intellectual property laws and to insure that
accused merchants do not have their payment services unfairly
terminated.
A. Extraterritoriality
For rights owners, the appeal of payment blockades lies largely in
their ability to reach, in SOPA’s parlance, “foreign infringing sites.”194
Such sites are beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. authorities because their
domain names are registered outside the United States and their operators
and servers are physically located abroad.195 If there is a conflict of
193. Member Associations, IACC, http://www.iacc.org/member-associations.html (last
visited July 5, 2015).
194. See SOPA, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(a) (1st Sess. 2011) (defining “foreign
infringing site”).
195. With the passage of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property (PRO-IP) Act of 2008, websites with U.S.-registered domain names became subject to
in rem seizure and forfeiture by the U.S. government, even when their operators and servers are
located abroad. See 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2012) (providing for civil forfeiture of “property used . . . in
any manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of [any criminal copyright or trademark
infringement]”); see also Bridy, Carpe Omnia, supra note 9, at 708–12 (discussing the PRO-IP
Act and Operation In Our Sites, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s domain name
seizure program for domestically registered domain names); Jack Mellyn, “Reach Out and Touch
Someone”: The Growing Use of Domain Name Seizure as a Vehicle for the Extraterritorial
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intellectual property laws between the United States and a jurisdiction in
which a targeted site is registered and its operators and servers are
located, the foreign operator of the targeted site and the site’s non-U.S.
customers could become indirectly subject to U.S. law through the
imposition of a voluntary payment blockade.196 Voluntary payment
blockades can thus operate as a vehicle for the extraterritorial application
of U.S. intellectual property laws, which can be significantly friendlier to
rights owners than laws in other jurisdictions.197 Under domestic judicial
precedents, U.S. copyright law can have no extraterritorial effect.198
Federal trademark law, on the other hand, can have extraterritorial effect,
but only in very limited circumstances.199 If payment processors are to
avoid becoming copyright and trademark norm exporters for the benefit
of U.S.-based rights owners, online payment blockades must be “zoned”
to reach only transactions involving U.S. customers attempting to procure
materials that are infringing or counterfeit under U.S. law.200
Problems of extraterritoriality were at the forefront in the case of
AllofMP3.com, an online music store hosted in Russia and operated by
Russian nationals.201 The site sold millions of unauthorized downloads of
copyrighted songs for a tiny fraction of the price charged by licensed
Enforcement of U.S. Law, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1241, 1255 (2011) (arguing that U.S. domain name
seizures violate established principles of domestic and international law, including norms
governing jurisdiction to prescribe).
196. Cf. MacCarthy, supra note 19, at 1091–92 (pointing out that legal disputes involving
cross-border online transactions can be complex for payment processors to assess and navigate
when the merchant and the customer are in different jurisdictions and either the laws in the two
jurisdictions are not the same or the legal situation in one country differs from that of the other).
197. See, e.g., id. at 1095 (noting that in one case, “a local court ordered a local bank to
continue to provide payment services” despite the fact that “these transactions would still be
illegal in virtually every other country in the world”).
198. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1376 (2013) (stating that the
Copyright Act does not apply extraterritorially); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that “foreign-hosted images are extraterritorial and not
actionable under the [Copyright] Act”).
199. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding that federal trademark law may reach foreign activities if they have the requisite
effect on U.S. commerce).
200. The principle that the Internet should be zoned to enable territorial sovereigns to enforce
laws and adjudicate disputes goes back to the Internet’s early days and to debates over restrictions
on sexually explicit speech. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (2005) (“Technologies should be available to enable Internet
participants to respect the rule of law in states where their Internet activities reach.”).
201. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 6,
Arista Records LLC v. MediaServices LLC, No. 06 Civ. 15319 (NRB), 2008 WL 563470
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008). The company registered the domain name for the website, however, in
the United States. Id. at 4 (stating that the company registered the domain name with
Register.com, Inc., a New York corporation).
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distribution channels like iTunes.202 In December 2006, U.S.-based
record labels sued the site’s operator, MediaServices LLC, in federal
district court in New York for $1.65 trillion in damages for direct and
secondary copyright infringement.203 Under U.S. copyright law, the site
was operating illegally.204 Under Russian law, however, it was not.205
Having no corporate presence in the United States, MediaServices elected
not to answer the complaint.206 Instead, it published a defiant statement
on AllofMP3.com asserting the legality of its operation under Russian
law and its right not to submit to the jurisdiction of New York courts.207
It refused to accept service of process in Russia under Russian rules of
procedure, and it opposed the plaintiffs’ motion for authorization of
substituted service in the United States under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.208 After the judge in the case granted the labels’ motion and
authorized substituted service on MediaServices’ New York attorneys,
MediaServices moved to quash the substituted service.209 It was bound

202. See Erik Larson, Music Industry Drops Copyright Suit Against Russian Music Site,
BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2008, 5:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=as0feZVmo0_A (“The Web site had 5.5 million subscribers, who paid
between 10 and 20 cents per song, compared with 99 cents charged by Apple Inc.’s online iTunes
store.”).
203. See Michael Arrington, AllOfMP3 Responds to RIAA’s $1.65 Trillion Lawsuit,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2006), http://techcrunch.com/2006/12/27/allofmp3-responds-to-riaas165-trillion-lawsuit/ (reporting on the filing of the suit).
204. Bush administration officials reportedly called the site a “poster child for Internet music
piracy.” Larson, supra note 202.
205. See Court Acquits AllOfMp3.com Site Owner, CNN (Aug. 15, 2007, 10:46 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/biztech/08/15/russia.site.reut/index.html?eref=rss_tech
(reporting on the Russian court’s decision that the site’s operator, Denis Kvasov, was not liable
for copyright infringement because he paid a portion of the site’s revenue to “ROMS, a Russian
organization which collects and distributes royalties for copyright holders”).
206. Arista Records LLC v. MediaServices LLC, No. 06 Civ. 15319 (NRB), 2008 WL
563470, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008) (“MediaServices has no known corporate presence in the
United States.”).
207. Arrington, supra note 203 (“This suit is unjustified as AllofMP3 does not operate in
New York. Certainly the labels are free to file any suit they wish, despite knowing full well that
AllofMP3 operates legally in Russia. In the meantime, AllofMP3 plans to continue to operate
legally and comply with all Russian laws.”).
208. See MediaServices, 2008 WL 563470, at *1–*2 (explaining the steps plaintiffs took to
try to effect service of process in Russia and holding that there was no point in requiring plaintiffs
to serve process pursuant to the Hague Service Convention because judicial cooperation between
the United States and the Russian Federation had long since been suspended, and Russian
authorities would have refused service).
209. See Notice of Motion to Quash Service or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint for Insufficiency of Service of Process at 1–2, MediaServices, No. 06-15319.
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and determined not to litigate the case on its merits in the United States
under U.S. law.210
Covering all their bases, and likely anticipating the tooth-and-nail
fight over jurisdiction in New York, the record labels were already
pursuing extrajudicial (i.e., private and political) remedies when they
filed the suit. In September 2006, the International Federation for the
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) successfully prevailed upon Visa and
MasterCard to voluntarily stop processing payments for the site.211 In
addition, the U.S. Trade Representative pressured Russia to amend its law
to illegalize the site as a soft condition for entry into the World Trade
Organization.212 Although Russia did later amend its law, the site-wide
payment blockade went into effect before the change occurred.213 In the
interim, Visa and MasterCard were enforcing U.S. copyright law in
Russia and blocking transactions that were legal in Russia.214
MediaServices sued Visa in Russian court for breach of Visa’s terms of
service and won.215 The victory was moot, however, in light of both the
intervening change in Russian law and the pre-judgment impact of the

210. If the underlying events in the case had occurred after the launch of Operation in Our
Sites in 2010, the AllofMP3.com domain name, by virtue of its registration in the United States,
would have been eligible for in rem seizure at the labels’ request by the Department of Homeland
Security on the ground that it facilitated criminal copyright infringement. See supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
211. Nate Anderson, Music Industry Encouraged Visa to Pull the Plug on AllofMP3.com
(Updated), ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 19, 2006, 11:59 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2006/10/8
029/; Credit Card Firms Cut off AllofMP3.com, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 19, 2006, 7:44 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15323093/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/creditcard-firms-cut-allofmpcom/.
212. Thomas Crampton, Russian Download Site Is Popular and Possibly Illegal, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/world/europe/01cnd-mp3.html (reporting
that “American trade negotiators darkly warned that the Web site could jeopardize Russia’s longsought entry into the World Trade Organization”).
213. See Janko Roettgers, AllOfMp3 Vows to Continue Despite Tougher Copyright Laws,
P2P BLOG (Sept. 1, 2006, 1:20 PM), http://www.p2p-blog.com/item-142.html.
214. See Jacqui Cheng, AllOfMP3.com Down, but Not Out, ARS TECHNICA (July 3, 2007,
11:51 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/07/allofmp3-com-breathes-its-final-breath/
(reporting that Russia agreed to modify its laws by June 1, 2007 to make the site illegal).
215. See Nate Anderson, Russian Court Rules That Visa Must Process Payments for
AllofMP3.com, ARS TECHNICA (July 16, 2007, 1:59 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2007/07/russian-court-rules-that-visa-must-process-payments-for-allofmp3-com/
(reporting on the court’s decision against Rosbank, the Russia-based acquiring bank that serviced
AllofMP3.com’s Visa account).
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payment blockade.216 During the pendency of the litigation, the site shut
down, leading the labels to dismiss the suit in May 2008.217
Limiting the geographic scope of payment blockades can mitigate the
problem of extraterritoriality and prevent U.S. law from becoming, de
facto, the law governing every card-mediated transaction involving an
accused online merchant, no matter where the merchant and its customers
are located. Although mapping real-space territorial boundaries onto the
Internet presents well-documented practical and theoretical challenges,
legal frameworks for adjudicating conflicts of law in disputes involving
cross-border transactions predate the Internet and have proven adaptable
to online scenarios.218 In the anti-piracy and anti-counterfeiting domains,
MasterCard’s payment blocking policy is representative of the approach
payment processors have taken to handling conflicts of law between an
online merchant’s home jurisdiction and an online customer’s home
jurisdiction:
If the Merchant is located in a country where the online sale
of the alleged Illegitimate Product does not violate
applicable country laws, the Acquirer must suspend or
terminate acquiring sales by that Merchant to account
holders of accounts issued in countries where the sale of the
alleged Illegitimate Product is illegal or is otherwise
prohibited by local law.219
Under this policy payments to a merchant from customers holding
accounts in Country A are blocked if the transactions in question are
illegal in Country A, even if the transactions are legal in Country B, the
merchant’s home country. If the transactions are legal in both Country A
and Country B, then payments to the merchant in Country B from

216. Cheng, supra note 214.
217. See Larson, supra note 202 (reporting that the labels dismissed the suit because, in the
words of a music industry spokesman, “[t]he site is now defunct and out of business, the result of
a successful anti-piracy initiative”).
218. The debate over extraterritoriality, choice of law, and spillover effects is seminal in the
field of cyberspace law. Compare David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996) (arguing for the exceptionalist view
that the Internet’s disregard for geographical boundaries “throws the law into disarray by creating
entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be
governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign”), with Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 475, 475 (1998) (arguing for the non-exceptionalist view that “from the perspective of
jurisdiction and choice of law, territorial regulation of the Internet is no less feasible and no less
legitimate than territorial regulation of non-Internet transactions”).
219. SOPA Hearing, supra note 124, at 96–98 (Appendix A to statement of Linda
Kirkpatrick) (explaining MasterCard’s anti-piracy policies).
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customers in Country A are processed.220 Visa calls this principle “dual
jurisdictional compliance”: If the merchant and his customer are
physically located in different countries, then the merchant must comply
with the laws of the customer’s country as if the merchant were physically
located in that country.221
The best practices agreement provides for jurisdictionally selective
blocking in the same manner as MasterCard’s and Visa’s policies; it
requires payment processors, acting on an allegation of infringement
under U.S. copyright or trademark law, to “suspend or terminate payment
services to [the accused] merchant with United States account
holders.”222 By limiting the blockade to payments from U.S. account
holders, the best practices agreement does not prevent transactions that
are legal for both the merchant and the customer in the countries where
they are physically located.223 This solves the extraterritoriality problem
that confronted AllofMP3.com.
The agreement does, however, export U.S. law to the extent that a
merchant located in a country where infringing-under-U.S.-law
transactions are legal must treat those transactions as illegal when U.S.
account holders are on the other side of them.224 Such is the case,
however, with cross-border transactions in physical space. For example,
a seller of hashish in Amsterdam cannot legally ship product into Albany,
even though a tourist from Albany is free to partake at an Amsterdam
cafe. Considered in terms of negative impacts on the overall integrity of
the global e-commerce system, the “zoned” payment blockades
contemplated in the best practices agreement are preferable to the
“zoned” DNS blocking protocols contemplated in COICA, SOPA, and
PIPA, because payment blockades don’t threaten to wreak havoc on the
Internet’s addressing system.225
220. PayPal has a similar conflict-of-laws policy governing online gambling transactions.
See PayPal Acceptable Use Policy, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ua/
acceptableuse-full (last updated Feb. 28, 2015) (prohibiting gambling transactions unless “the
operator and customers are located exclusively in jurisdictions where such activities are permitted
by law”).
221. See Online Pharmacy Guide for Acquirers, VISA INC., at 10 (June 2014),
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/Online-Pharmacy-Guide-for-Acquirers-June-2014.pdf
(“If the . . . merchant is in a different country than the cardholder, the merchant must comply with
the laws and regulations in the cardholder’s country as if it were physically located in that
country.”).
222. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 3 (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Vixie, supra note 117; see also Steve Crocker et al., Security and Other
Technical Concerns Raised by the DNS Filtering Requirements in the PROTECT IP Bill,
DOMAININCITE.COM, at 3 (May 2011), http://domainincite.com/docs/PROTECT-IP-TechnicalWhitepaper-Final.pdf (“Mandated DNS filtering would be minimally effective and would present
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B. Fair Process
What is most troubling about payment blockades is that they are
imposed summarily by entities ill-suited to make on-the-fly
determinations concerning the merits of intellectual property disputes,
particularly with respect to websites where infringing and noninfringing
content commingle. Payment processors can do a pretty good job of
limiting blockades geographically through the principle of dual
jurisdictional compliance; the less tractable challenge is to impose
payment blockades justifiably—in a way that does not deny fair process
to accused online merchants or impede the sale and distribution of lawful
content and products to consumers who want them. Two features of the
best practices protocol are concerning in this respect: (1) the protocol
places the burden of proof on the accused merchant to prove her
innocence following a complaint from a rights owner, and (2) the protocol
substitutes the hurried judgment of a participating intermediary for the
more deliberate judgment of a court. These two features make private
enforcement much more efficient but also much less procedurally fair
than civil judicial process.
The best practices agreement requires payment processors to
investigate rights owners’ complaints and puts the onus in an
investigation on the accused merchant to prove to the satisfaction of the
payment processor that the merchant is not engaged in infringing sales.226
This arrangement reverses the ordinary allocation of burdens in a civil
suit for infringement by requiring the accused party to prove its nonliability through the provision of “credible evidence.”227 The agreement
leaves it to the discretion of a payment processor to determine the nature
and scope of its investigations.228 On that point, the agreement does not
appear to contemplate much beyond the payment processor’s asking the
merchant to “provide written evidence that it has the right to legitimately
sell the product in question.”229 Just as the agreement doesn’t require a
rights owner to perform test transactions before submitting a complaint,
it doesn’t require a payment processor to conduct test transactions in the
technical challenges that could frustrate important security initiatives. Additionally, it would
promote development of techniques and software that circumvent use of the DNS. These actions
would threaten the DNS’s ability to provide universal naming, a primary source of the Internet’s
value as a single, unified, global communications network.”).
226. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 2–3.
227. Cf. Arrow Novelty Co. v. ENCO Nat’l Corp., 393 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff’d, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing the ordinary allocation of burdens in a civil suit for
infringement).
228. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 6 (stating that each payment processor
resolves investigations in accordance with its own internal policies and procedures).
229. See Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 2.
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course of an investigation.230 The payment processor performs both
investigative and adjudicative functions, taking findings of fact and
conclusions of law about copyright and trademark infringement out of the
hands of juries and judges.
An accused merchant’s avenue of redress also detours around the
courthouse. If the merchant wants to contest the outcome of a payment
processor’s investigation or the imposition of a sanction, its appeal is to
the payment processor, which owes it a “prompt review” under the terms
of the agreement.231 The agreement doesn’t specify either temporally or
substantively what review will suffice. If a rights owner wants to go to
the mat in a particular case, however, the payment processor may do its
bidding, in spite of a reasonable belief that the merchant is not engaged
in infringement, if the rights owner agrees to defend, indemnify, and hold
the payment processor harmless for the contested blockade.232 If the
rights owner is willing to assume the risk of suit, the agreement is such
that the payment processor can impose a payment blockade and more or
less wash its hands of any adverse legal consequences. That arrangement
creates an incentive for payment processors to over-block merchants and
leaves final decisions about disputed blockades in the hands of
complaining rights owners. Whether, and to what extent, a revenuerelated disincentive might offset that incentive to over-block is unclear.
But given the fact that participating rights owners are themselves very
high-value customers for payment processors, the business incentive to
over-block may be irresistible.
To protect fairness in the face of efficiency, the best practices
agreement for payment processors should incorporate a right of review
by a legally competent neutral third party, as, for example, the CAS
does.233 The AllofMP3.com case demonstrated that a civil suit for breach
of contract between a wrongfully blockaded merchant and his payment
processor is always available as a backstop; however, if the goal of
voluntary agreements as a genre is to provide for efficient, fair, and selfcontained private resolution of online intellectual property disputes, then
such agreements should always include the option for review by a neutral
third party.

230. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 150, at 5.
231. Best Practices for Payment Processors, supra note 125, at 3.
232. See id.
233. See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 22, at 53–54 (explaining that a broadband
user subject to a “mitigation measure” within the CAS has the right to appeal the sanction to a
third-party arbitrator before the sanction is imposed).
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IV. WORKING AROUND PAYMENT BLOCKADES: OTHER WAYS TO PAY
Any method of enforcing intellectual property rights online is only as
effective as it is difficult to circumvent. For determined online infringers,
getting around the obstacles that rights owners erect between them and
free content has always been the name of the game.234 Since before the
dawn of the cat meme, technically savvy infringers have been leading
rights owners on a merry chase across the Internet. In light of this rich
history of evasion, answering the “circumvention question” is essential
to assessing whether Internet payment blockades can actually make
online infringement unprofitable.
If an online merchant is wholly or even predominantly reliant on
traditional payment systems to realize revenue from transactions, then the
imposition of a payment blockade will be fatal to that merchant’s
business. If, however, an online merchant can accept payments outside of
traditional payment systems or can route card payments around payment
blockades, then payment blockades become less effective, if not
altogether neutralized, as an enforcement tool. This Part considers the use
of vouchers and virtual currencies—specifically Bitcoin—to circumvent
payment blockades.
A. Vouchers for Downloads
The use of vouchers to pay for downloads at AllofMP3.com followed
shortly after payment processors instituted their blockade of the site.235 A
man alleged to be a U.K.-based agent of AllofMP3.com listed vouchers,
valued at ten pounds apiece, for sale on both eBay and the dedicated URL
allofmp3vouchers.co.uk.236 The sale of vouchers on eBay was a means of
co-opting a legitimate marketplace by tapping into its users’ ability to
make payments through the very payment processors that had cut off
direct payments to AllofMP3.com. Each voucher contained an access
code that enabled its user to download tracks from AllofMP3.com.237
Before London police shut down the voucher scheme, it generated an
estimated tens-of-thousands of pounds in revenue for the blockaded
Russian site, all of it deposited into offshore accounts.238 Although the
voucher workaround was short-lived, it is a striking example of how
234. Cf. Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of
Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567 (2012) (discussing user
strategies for circumventing geolocation tools to access regionally restricted content online).
235. See Cheng, supra note 214 (reporting that the payment blockade of AllOfMP3.com by
major credit card companies “didn’t stop voucher sites from popping up that allowed customers
to purchase gift certificates to [the site]”).
236. John Leyden, Police Raid Ends AllofMP3.com Vouchers, THE REGISTER (May 21, 2007,
1:00 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/21/allofmp3_voucher_raid/.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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nimble and creative determined infringers can be in the face of new
enforcement strategies. The scheme’s Russia-to-U.K. connection also
highlights the global reach and organized nature of efforts to circumvent
online anti-piracy and anti-counterfeiting enforcement.
B. Bitcoin and Other P2P Virtual Currencies
Compared to gimmicky voucher schemes, virtual currencies represent
a more robust means of circumventing payment blockades. They have
demonstrable legitimate uses and significant growth potential, though it
remains unclear whether they will become mainstream.239 Just as P2P
electronic file-sharing protocols eliminate the need for a centralized
intermediary to host files or maintain a searchable file index, P2P virtual
currencies eliminate the need for third-party payment intermediaries to
act as trusted authorities for processing and verifying transactions
between merchants and customers.240 They cut out the middleman.
Bitcoin, the most well-known of the P2P virtual currencies, relies on
public key encryption and a public ledger maintained by the system’s
participants to log each transaction, thereby preventing individual
Bitcoins from being double-spent.241 By virtue of its reliance on public
key encryption, Bitcoin belongs to the subset of virtual currencies known
as cryptocurrencies.242
Greatly simplified, a Bitcoin transaction works in the following
way243: Say that Alice wants to transfer two Bitcoins to Bob. Alice and
239. See Timothy B. Lee, This Senate Hearing Is a Bitcoin Lovefest, WASH. POST (Nov. 18,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/18/this-senate-hearing-isa-bitcoin-lovefest/ (reporting that witnesses at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs were attuned to potential criminal uses of Bitcoin but also
mindful of the virtual currency’s legal uses and innovative potential).
240. See P. CARL MULLAN, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLENGE: SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT
SYSTEMS THROUGH U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 86 (2014) (“Transactions on the Bitcoin
network never need to circulate through a traditional financial institution or bank. The network
operates peer-to-peer. A ubiquitous requirement of trust in government and central banks present
in all government-issued fiat currency has been completely removed from Bitcoin transactions.”);
see also Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, at 1 (describing, as the pseudonymous originator of the Bitcoin
system, “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing
any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third
party”).
241. See Morgen E. Peck, Bitcoin: The Cryptoanarchists’ Answer to Cash, IEEE SPECTRUM,
(May 30, 2012, 11:33 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/bitcoin-thecryptoanarchists-answer-to-cash/0 (describing the verification and logging of transactions in the
Bitcoin system to prevent double-spending).
242. Mariella Moon, A Brief Attempt at Explaining the Madness of Cryptocurrency,
ENGADGET.COM (Jan. 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2015/01/21/cryptocurrencyexplainer/ (noting that Bitcoin was the first recognized cryptocurrency).
243. See How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works (last visited
July 5, 2015).
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Bob each use a Bitcoin client to join the Bitcoin P2P network. Alice and
Bob each have a Bitcoin “wallet” on their computers. Inside each wallet,
there is some number of virtual addresses, each of which has its own
balance of Bitcoins. Alice publicly declares, via her client, that an address
in her wallet wants to re-assign two of the Bitcoins associated with it to
an address in Bob’s wallet. Anyone on the network can verify the
transaction between the address in Alice’s wallet and the address in Bob’s
wallet using public-key cryptography. Using public-key cryptography,
the network’s participants verify the validity of Alice and Bob’s
transaction as a matter of consensus and append it to the public history of
previously agreed-upon transactions. This public history, or ledger, is
known as the block chain.244 In the Bitcoin system, the block chain
substitutes for a trusted third party as the means of verifying
transactions.245 Participants in the network who maintain the block chain
are called miners and receive newly mined Bitcoins as compensation for
their computational work.246 Because this method of compensating those
who do the work of keeping the currency secure and verified inheres in
the system’s architecture, the cost of trust is not passed on to those
engaging in transactions.
Bitcoin is attractive to online merchants and their customers for a
number of reasons. Because no third-party payment processors are
involved in Bitcoin transactions, merchants pay no third-party transaction
fees. They can retain their saved costs as profits or pass them along to
customers in the form of lower prices. Merchants also have freedom from
contract within the Bitcoin system. They do not have to agree, in
exchange for the right to receive payments, to any standardized terms of
service or codes of business conduct drafted by payment processors.
Absent those contractual relationships, payment processors cannot
unilaterally terminate merchants’ ability to receive payments for any
actual or alleged misconduct. By opting into the Bitcoin system and out
of traditional payment systems, merchants can avoid becoming subject to
the private law enforcement regime to which payment processors have
agreed in the voluntary best practices agreement.
Cutting out the middleman as a private law enforcer cannot be
equated, however, with wholesale evasion of law enforcement within the
Bitcoin economy. Criminally inclined online merchants who have
embraced the free-wheeling culture of Bitcoin in its immature phase will
244. Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System, IEEE
1319 (2012), available at http://www.cs.kent.edu/~javed/class-P2P13F/papers-2013/P03bitcoinanonymity-Reid.pdf.
245. Id. at 1319–20.
246. See id. at 1319 (describing how Bitcoin works); see also Peck, supra note 241, at 3
(providing a detailed infographic of a Bitcoin transaction).
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have a progressively harder time operating under the radar as Bitcoin’s
proponents intensify their efforts to make the system part of the financial
mainstream.247 When the FBI cracked down on the darknet online
marketplace known as the Silk Road in late 2013, agents seized 144,000
Bitcoins with a market value of $28 million.248 For more than two years
before the FBI shut it down, the Silk Road was an online bazaar for all
manner of contraband—from narcotics to guns to counterfeit goods and
(presumably, child) pornography.249 Bitcoin was the coin of the realm.
The Silk Road’s seizure by federal agents was a very public signal that
the Bitcoin system will be brought by degrees within the financial
regulatory and law enforcement framework outside of which it operated
in its first few years of existence—and within which traditional payment
networks have long operated. For legitimate merchants, participation in
a more highly regulated and policed Bitcoin system will remain a way to
avoid both transaction costs and compliance costs associated with
traditional payment networks. Merchants who accept Bitcoin will
increasingly have to do business within the limits of public law, but they
will always remain free of the private-law obligations that go hand-inglove with reliance on trusted payment processors.
Bitcoin appeals to buyers in online marketplaces primarily because
Bitcoin transactions can afford a degree of privacy not associated with
card payments. Traditional payment networks operate on the “know your
customer” principle, which is a rule of verification required in part to
safeguard the security of transactions and in part to ensure compliance
with anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism laws.250 Payments in a
traditional payment system are linked to verified personal accounts
belonging to verified individuals. Bitcoin is not (and was not designed to
be) intrinsically private or anonymous, despite public perception to the
247. See generally Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating
Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 813, 815 (2014) (reviewing recent regulatory developments with respect to virtual
currencies generally and concluding, based on those developments, that “it is unrealistic to
imagine that cryptocurrencies will not face regulation in the United States”); see also François R.
Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, CHI. FED LETTER, Dec. 2013, at 4 (“Should [B]itcoin become widely
accepted, it is unlikely [to] remain free of government intervention, if only because the governance
of the [B]itcoin code and network is opaque and vulnerable.”).
248. See Samuel Rubenfeld, US Says It Makes ‘Largest-Ever’ Bitcoin Seizure, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 28, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/10/28/us-says-it-makeslargest-ever-bitcoin-seizure/.
249. See Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large
Anonymous Online Marketplace, 22 INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 213 (2013), available at
http://www2013.org/proceedings/p213.pdf.
250. See Möser et al., An Inquiry into Money Laundering Tools in the Bitcoin Ecosystem,
2013 APWG ECRIME RESEARCHERS SUMMIT 1, available at https://maltemoeser.de/paper/moneylaundering.pdf (explaining the regulatory function of the “Know-Your-Customer” principle).
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contrary.251 The block chain, after all, contains a public record of every
consummated Bitcoin transaction.
If Bitcoin users are careful, however, they can achieve a degree of
privacy with Bitcoin that is unrealizable in a traditional payment
system.252 As one commentator explains, “Bitcoin is often described as
providing pseudoanonymity, by creating enough obfuscation to provide
users with plausible deniability.”253 The cause of obfuscation can be
furthered if a user maintains multiple public keys and avoids revealing
identifying information connected to her public keys.254 It also helps for
the payee to generate a new cryptographic key pair for each
transaction.255 For an added layer of obfuscation, third-party Bitcoin
“mixers” or “laundries” offer Bitcoin users the ability to mingle their
funds with a large pool of existing funds to make the origin of a particular
transaction difficult to trace.256 But even when users take steps to protect
their privacy, researchers studying the extent of plausible deniability
within the Bitcoin system caution that the system was not designed to
protect anonymity and that able researchers can identify repeat users
using purely passive analysis.257 The upshot for online buyers seeking
transactional privacy is that Bitcoin is potentially more anonymous than
credit cards but less anonymous than cash.258
For as much as merchants and buyers see benefits in routing online
transactions around traditional payment systems, the long-term
sustainability of the Bitcoin system is uncertain.259 Large fluctuations in

251. See Reid & Harrigan, supra note 244, at 1318 (commenting on the public misperception
that Bitcoin is anonymous).
252. See id. at 1321 (explaining steps a Bitcoin user can take to protect his anonymity).
253. Peck, supra note 241.
254. Reid & Harrigan, supra note 244, at 1319.
255. Id.
256. See Möser et al., supra note 250, at 5–6 (evaluating the efficacy of three Bitcoin mixing
services for anonymizing transactions); Jon Matonis, The Politics of Bitcoin Mixing Services,
FORBES (June 5, 2013, 11:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2013/06/05/thepolitics-of-bitcoin-mixing-services/ (describing different models for Bitcoin mixing).
257. See Reid & Harrigan, supra note 244, at 1325 (“Technical members of the Bitcoin
community have cautioned that strong anonymity is not a prominent design goal of the Bitcoin
system. However, casual users need to be aware of this, especially when sending Bitcoins to users
and organizations they would prefer not to be publicly associated with.”).
258. Ian Miers and his co-authors have described a fully anonymized cryptographic
extension to Bitcoin called “Zerocoin.” See Ian Miers et al., Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed ECash from Bitcoin, in 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 397, available at
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a397.pdf. They acknowledge, however,
that “[their] work leaves several open problems.” Id. at 408.
259. See Velde, supra note 247, at 3 (pointing out that as a fiduciary currency, “Bitcoin is
free of the power of the state, but it is also outside the protection of the state,” making it fragile).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/1

44

Bridy: Internet Payment Blockades

2015]

INTERNET PAYMENT BLOCKADES

1567

value have beset the currency,260 and the largest Bitcoin exchange, Mt.
Gox, suspended trading and filed for bankruptcy in 2014.261 At the time
of its collapse, Mt. Gox announced that it could not account for 850,000
of its customers’ Bitcoins, valued at $460 million.262 It subsequently
“found” 200,000 of them, but the rest remained unaccounted for as the
company entered liquidation.263 As the dust settles on the Mt. Gox fiasco,
Bitcoin’s backers are working to stabilize the currency’s value, build
consumer confidence in it, and bring it into regulatory compliance.264 If
they succeed, Bitcoin will continue to offer online merchants and buyers
a viable alternative to traditional payment systems and a way around
those systems’ private anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy operations.
CONCLUSION
Internet payment blockades are the fruits of a long-term, evolving
strategy by corporate copyright and trademark owners to leave no
intermediary behind when it comes to online intellectual property
enforcement. Where judicial and legislative efforts failed to yield any
binding public law requiring payment processors like MasterCard and
Visa to act as intellectual property enforcers, “non-regulatory”
intervention from the executive branch secured their cooperation as a
matter of private ordering. The resulting voluntary best practices
agreement prescribes a notice-and-termination protocol that extends the
reach of U.S. intellectual property law into cyberspace, to merchants
operating websites from servers and physical facilities located abroad. It
also removes adjudications of infringement claims from the courts to the
private sector, which raises issues of fairness and institutional
competence. Like other forms of regulation by online intermediaries,
payment blockades can be circumvented with the aid of disintermediating
technologies. True to the Internet’s founding purpose of redirecting data
260. See Kurt Avard, Are Bitcoin Pricing Fluctuations Growing Pains or the Beginning of
the End?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/02/
12/are-bitcoin-pricing-fluctuations-growing-pains-or.aspx (reporting on Bitcoin price
fluctuations and their probable underlying causes).
261. Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, WIRED
(Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/ (reporting on the
demise of Mt. Gox and attributing its failure to “a messy combination of poor management,
neglect, and raw inexperience”).
262. Id.
263. James Lyne, $116 Million Bitcoins ‘Found’ at MtGox and How to Protect Your Wallet,
FORBES (Mar. 21, 2014, 10:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jameslyne/2014/03/21/116million-bitcoins-found-at-mtgox-and-how-to-protect-your-wallet/.
264. See, e.g., Stan Higgins, 3 Forces Shaping Next-Generation Bitcoin Exchanges,
COINDESK (Aug. 31, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/3-forces-shaping-nextgeneration-bitcoin-exchanges/; Wayne Lam, Bitcoin Backers Work to Make It Mainstream,
FORBES (May 27, 2014, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2014/05/27/bitcoinbackers-work-to-make-it-mainstream/.
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flows around blocked or damaged channels, P2P virtual currencies like
Bitcoin are empowering online merchants and their customers, at least
for the time being, to run payment blockades.
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